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Getting to the Table: Creating the
Forum for Negotiations in Deep-Rooted
Conflicts
James H. Laue
ABSTRACT
The first step in the conflict resolution process is establishing a forum in which
cooperative negotiation can occur among the parties. Three aspects of this
"getting to the table" process are analyzed: functional requirements for the
table or setting, methods of getting the parties there, and value choices about
the nature of the table and the process there.
True resolution of conflict—in contrast to management, settlement, win-
ning-losing or mere termination—occurs only through negotiation or some
other form of mutual problem-solving. This principle is especially relevant
wherever deep-rooted conflicts persevere, particularly where differences
are rooted in religion, race, ethnicity or other sources of group identity.
Coercion and continued violation of the basic human needs for identity and
recognition never can "resolve" deep-rooted or political conflicts (Burton
1987). A settlement imposed by one of the parties or by an outside source
will not last unless the basic needs of each party are satisfied; that can only
take place through joint analysis, relationship building, and problem-solv-
ing among the parties.
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How is it possible for parties who have sworn not to talk with one
another to get to a negotiating table? How is it possible to build an envi-
ronment for problem-solving when the other party is defined as the prob-
lem? How can a setting be created for parties who have vowed never to
compromise, to shape compromises?
This article examines the process required to build a forum (i.e., an
environment, setting, or set of conditions) to which parties are willing to
come—at least for one meeting—to examine the prospects for resolution of
their conflicts. I have developed the phrase "getting to the table" which
describes that process, with "table" as a broad metaphor for the forum
(face-to-face, shuttle, or electronic) in which negotiation and problem-solv-
ing may take place among the disputing parties.
The Problem-Solving Paradigm in Political Conflicts
"Realism" and "Problem-Solving"
The so-called "realist" paradigm in international affairs has dominated
thinking about protracted political conflicts within nations and at the
regional level as well. The goal has been security in a dangerous world of
adversaries, with the strategic focus on control, enforcement and deter-
rence. Winning is the immediate objective in any conflict.
In the last two decades, a growing group of scholars and practitioners
has shifted the focus to resolving rather than winning conflicts, with the
strategic focus on analysis, problem-solving and negotiation (Burton 1969;
Doob 1970; Kelman and Cohen 1976; Zartman 1977; Fisher and Ury 1981;
Mitchell 1981; Banks 1984; Saunders 1985a). In this framework, all of
social life is a negotiated order, and self-interest is best served by engag-
ing in negotiated problem-solving with other self-interested entities in an
uncertain but interdependent world. Sustaining and improving the relation-
ship is as important as achieving a satisfactory substantive outcome in
conflict.
The getting-to-the table problem is set in the context of the joint prob-
lem-solving approach to political and deep-rooted conflicts. It values joint
approaches over unilateral action, face-to-face interaction, viewing the
other party or parties as negotiating partners with whom an agreement is
possible (rather than as enemies or opponents to be beaten, and a focus on
good relationships as well as good substantive outcomes. These are clear
process preferences, which may not be shared by the parties. Helping the
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parties to create and own the process is always the first step in helping
them create and own satisfactory outcomes.
Political Acts and Problem-Solving Fora
Harold Saunders, former U.S. assistant secretary of state for Middle
Eastern Affairs and a key player in the negotiations which led to the Camp
David Accords in 1978, appropriately insists that negotiation in political
and policy conflicts can only be understood by placing it in the context of
the ongoing flow of political acts of the parties. Negotiation is only one
form of interaction between nations or identity groups. It does not take
place in political isolation. It often occurs informally or through "back
channels" even when the dominant mode of interaction is war or some
other mode of adversarial behavior.
The beginning of negotiations usually represents a conscious choice of
the parties to change the forum in which their dispute is being conducted—
or at least a change in their perceptions of the relative advantages and dis-
advantages of a win-lose adversarial forum for conducting their dispute.
The brokering or coercion of a third party or parties may convince them to
change the forum. Changing the forum also is a political act and has a
political impact on the nature of the ensuing process.
This stage of conflict resolution, according to Saunders, is the most
neglected element in analyses of the process. Most of the myriad frame-
works explaining the phases of negotiation and mediation begin somewhere
near the middle of the actual process with a stage such as "Define the
Problem," tacitly assuming that the parties already have been identified and
have agreed on a venue and a set of procedures for negotiating. Instead, the
first stages are what a number of authors (Saunders 1985b; Zartman 1985;
and Bendahmane and McDonald 1986, 311) have termed "pre- negotia-
tion," du Toit "bargaining about bargaining" (1989), and Laue "getting to
the table" (1986; Laue et al. 1988; see also Stein 1989; Rothman 1990;
Potapchuk et al. 1990).
Cases abound to illustrate these processes and stages—and their essen-
tial functions in the transition from war or other adversarial fora to the
negotiating table: the preparation over several years of the Carter White
House for Camp David (Carter 1985; Quandt 1986), of Costa Rican
President Oscar Arias Sanchez in convening the Central American Peace
Process (Esquipulas Dos), of U.N. Secretary General Javier Perez de
Cuellar in Afghanistan and Iran-Iraq, of U.S. Assistant Secretary of State
Chester Crocker in Namibia (Laue 1991).
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Getting to the Table: Theory, Process, and Problems
A Theory of the Forum
A forum is any structured setting in which parties may communicate
their interests to each other and conduct problem-solving behavior about
issues between them. Establishing a forum acceptable to all the parties is
the first major stage in the resolution of deep-rooted political and identity
group conflicts. The forum in conflict resolution usually involves face-to-
face interaction among the parties, but also may be conducted with the aid
of third-party shuttles ("proximity talks" in United Nations parlance) or
electronic communications technology.
The concept of forum is not new. Archimedes understood it when he
said, "Give me a piece of ground to stand on, and I will move the world."
No significant social action occurs unless the participants have the appro-
priate base from which to move. The "peace pipe" ritual among Native
Americans and the structured exchange of peace masks and other ritual
objects among many tribal peoples provided the forum for religious, polit-
ical, and other types of negotiation with the gods or other humans. The
"Samoan Circle," the Quaker meeting, the New England town meeting, the
diplomatic conference, neighborhood "mediation" in China—all are exam-
ples of fora in which negotiation and other forms of social interaction have
taken place throughout history.
Elements of the forum required for resolution of conflict include:
1. Auspices. What persons or institutions provide the necessary societal
or group approbation necessary for legitimation of the forum? Who can
convene or otherwise cause the parties to meet initially? The auspices may
be provided by elders, the church, secular community leaders, any organi-
zation or combination of organizations (the United Nations or the
Organization for African Unity, for example, or the Red Cross or the Urban
Foundation), a person with credibility—any combination of persons and or
institutions acceptable to the parties.
2. Location(s). Where will the parties meet? In one location acceptable
to all? In several settings for balance and constituency acceptance? Only
via personal messenger or electronic means instead of face-to-face? Is a
high prestige venue required—or should it be highly confidential?
Historically, parties have gotten to the stump, the kitchen table, the wood-
shed, the circle on the ground, the bench, the bar, the altar, the street, the
battlefield, the bed, the press, or the hot tub. All are appropriate fora,
depending on the perceptions and preferences of the parties (or in some
cases, as with the woodshed, the dominant party).
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3. Time Frame. When shall we meet? How often? With what frequency?
Over what time period? Do we set the full schedule in advance, or are meet-
ing dates determined serially or as the need is defined? Is this a conflict
clearly limited by elections, military plans, the nature of the issue, the par-
ties, the phases of the moon, or other elements outside the control of the par-
ties? Who decides often is a crucial question in the politics of scheduling.
4. Participants. Who should be at the table—the direct parties, their rep-
resentatives, second-level parties, parties-in-exile, or scholars who under-
stand the parties' positions, sympathizers, relatives, indirect parties,
constituents or observers (how many?), only those bearing political recog-
nition or other form of legitimization, or only some of the parties? Who
decides who is a "direct" party? Who decides how big the table should be?
5. Role Relationships. The formal and informal role relationships parties
bring to the table are critical in determining their interaction. Is there a
prior relationship among any of the parties? Do they wish to maintain and
enhance it? Do any of the parties have direct authority over any of the oth-
ers (a cardinal and a priest, a tribal chief and a tribal member, a boss and
an employee)? Do the parties bring different historical relationships with
the mediator or other third-party who may be involved?
6. Procedures. Often the first joint decision fashioned by the parties at
the table, the ground rules, or the procedures under which the parties will
interact may proscribe the range of behaviors and outcomes in any given
forum. Are they imposed by an authority or developed jointly by the par-
ties? How are they enforced? What is the decision rule (voting, consensus,
other)? Caucuses? Observers? Who may speak? Is there a third party?
Media? Reporting to constituencies? Gandhi said it most succinctly: means
are pregnant with ends.
7. Issues. Issues are the substance of conflicts. An issue arises when
Party A believes Party B's behavior will prevent Party A from reaching an
important goal. Two basic types of issues in conflict are those about
resources (those goods, services and symbols valued by parties as neces-
sary for survival and the conduct of appropriate social interaction—e.g.,
food, shelter, clothing, money, education, information, security, territory,
prestige, affect) and power (control over decisions about the allocation of
resources). Conflicts involving power struggles always are more protracted,
deep-rooted, and contentious than those over resources alone. The use,
maintenance, and efficacy (and often the expansion) of power are at the
heart of all political disputes.
8. Communication Medium. The media for communication among dis-
puting parties may be live (face-to-face or through a shuttling intermedi-
ary), electronic (computer conference or telephonic connection), or print
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(thought exchange of hard copy though human or computer as intermedi-
ary). Parties ask, at least tacitly: what are the advantages and disadvantages
of joint, face-to-face interaction compared to the other communication
modes? Do we want to confer recognition on the other party or parties by
being in the same room with them? Can we vary modes of communication
to suit our perceived interests? What about the role of outside media—
should our communication with them be individual, joint, through a third
party, or not at all?
9. Values. Values (conceptions of the desirable and undesirable) under-
lie every element in a given forum and all the behavior exhibited there.
Choices are made, explicitly or implicitly, about a range of questions that
present themselves as a forum is built and operated. The most important
values underlying any negotiation or joint problem-solving approach have
to do with the nature of the process and the mode of interaction between
the participants. They are examined below in "Value Choices in Building
the Forum."
Why go to the Table?
Getting to the table does not assure getting to resolution. Parties in con-
flict may seek a forum, and/or agree to take part in negotiated problem-
solving, for a wide variety of reasons. In negotiations over policy and
political issues, coming to the table may be viewed as a political act itself
(i.e., designed to enhance one's power or the potential for a better outcome
by changing the forum), and what happens at the table as an extension of
political interaction in another forum.
Why go to the table? Parties may enter into negotiation or joint
problem-solving to accomplish any one or a combination of the following
objectives:
- to stall
- to avoid reaching an agreement
- to legitimate present political or military activity
- to save face
- to gather intelligence on the other party or parties
- to test the water or float an agreement
- to uni fy the home team
- to ceremonialize
- to ratify a prearranged understanding or agreement
- to send a message
- to solve a short-term problem
- to resolve the conflict through negotiation
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Those interested in achieving resolution of conflict through direct nego-
tiations have to find ways to assure that the major focus of the at-the-table
work will be on joint problem-solving and reaching a mutually acceptable
agreement, rather than on the range of other possible objectives illustrated
above. Carefully choosing the path to the table and the specific steps along
the way can help ensure the integrity of the process once there.
Some Paths to the Table
The previous section outlined the elements of the forum for which pro-
vision must be made before parties can begin substantive negotiations. The
process of putting those elements in place is the next focus of analysis.
There are a number of paths to the table for deeply divided parties. In
each case, the process is one of building confidence in the major actors that
they can—without serious political or physical vulnerability—hold at least
one exploratory contact with the other party or parties, usually in the form
of a joint meeting. Since moving from isolation or armed conflict into
negotiation is a high-risk political decision for parties in this type of con-
flict, they cannot be expected to buy into an entire plan for negotiation;
getting them to come to an exploratory meeting for discussion of condi-
tions and ground rules for possible negotiation is enough. Their expecta-
tion in going even this far is not to be embarrassed or made vulnerable;
maximally they can predict that a change of venue and form of the disput-
ing proces may work to their advantage.
In many conflicts, such movement toward a negotiation forum develops
as part of the ongoing perceptions and calculations of the parties regarding
their goals and the means available to achieve them, and response to the
incentives and disincentives to negotiate evolving from their conflict inter-
action. While the decision to go to the table is always a political act, the
ebb and flow of the political process often is the direct cause of such a
decision. Escalation of relationships from conflict to crisis occurs only
when at least one of the parties defines the situation as a crisis, thus requir-
ing new behaviors to protect perceived interests. Often the crisis definition
moves the parties to take military or other coercive action to reassess inter-
nal functioning—or to move to deal with a long-festering conflict that can
no longer be avoided or ignored. Building a forum to negotiate a solution
and prevent further crises now appears politically realistic and imminently
logical.
The process leading to the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, negotiated
in July 1963 by American, British, and Soviet representatives, had gone
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through a fitful series of starts, stalls, and stops for several years in the late
1950s. According to Griffiths (1989),
The ultimate prenegotiation that brought about the tripartite
Moscow talks might be said to have begun with the resolution
of the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 (78).
The Cuban crisis in particular served to underline [Soviet
Premier Nikita] Kruschev's inability to achieve a breakthrough
in improving the Soviet capacity to negotiate from acknowl-
edged strength (81).
The venture to the brink in the missile crisis had surely drawn
attention to the need for greater stability in Soviet-American
relations (82).
A crisis definition (and in this case, resolution of the crisis) changed the
parties' relationships, and helped move them to the table for negotiated
problem-solving. Stein concludes that the evidence from the six cases in
her study of international negotiation "suggests that leaders have decided
to consider negotiation when they see the need for astrategy of crisis avoid-
ance or post-crisis management or when they see a conjunction of threat
and opportunity, when prenegotiation promises to reduce some of the risks
associated with negotiation, and when they anticipate benefits from the
process which are largely independent of whether or not it culminates in
agreement" (1989, 247). When politics-as-usual fails to bring parties to the
negotiating table—or directly blocks the path—there are a variety of paths
to the table which may be promoted by third parties, including at least the
following.
1. One-on-one Analysis. One person or a team may call on parties one
at a time, enlisting their aid in assessing the conflict and the prospects for
establishing a negotiating process. This approach goes directly to the basic
requirement to move parties form bi-lateral or multi-lateral ad hominem
attacks to a consideration of turning their focus away from each other to a
third focus—in this case, joint analysis of the problem and the creative task
of fashioning a table. I have found in a number of applications of this
approach that most parties quickly become interested in the analytical and
strategic questions being posed, for they are directing energy to a task on
which they have some considerable expertise.
During the interviewing and assessment stage, it is possible to accom-
plish, in the most direct way possible, the identification of elements of the
potential forum outlined earlier in this paper. Of equal importance to an
assessor cum mediator is the development of relationships with the
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stakeholders and helping serve as a medium to start moving information
among the parties—which they inevitably ask for as they discover the
assessor has had broader contact with the dispute and the other parties than
they have.
The key requirement in this approach is to gain access to the parties for
the interview. Often an academic base and a clear scholarly task which
requires the parties' assistance is enough to get in the door.
EXAMPLE: Under the auspices of the mayor and a member of the state
highway commission, my colleague Sharon Burde and I interviewed 26
persons individually between October 1985 and January 1986 in Fort Worth
about their role in and analysis of a dispute over downtown highway expan-
sion that had been brewing since 1979. Study documents, consultant
reports, lawsuits, and the operation of the traditional highway planning pro-
cess had failed to resolve the dispute. The interviewees were asked to join
us in an analysis of the issues and help build a process and agenda for res-
olution. Most interviews were one to two hours; one lasted for five hours.
The process culminated in an analysis of the dispute presented to all those
interviewed and an invitation from the mayor and the commissioner to the
seven major parties identified to attend an exploratory meeting with the
interviewers. Through a hybrid negotiations/problem-solving process that
operated under the auspices of the Conflict Clinic for three years in con-
junction with the prescribed federal, state and city planning frames, full
consensus on a plan was reached. Implementation of the plan now is under
way (Laue et al. 1988).
2. Convenor. In some situations, a powerful broker may be required.
Who has the power, the credibility and/or the relationship with the parties
to bring them to the table? This is the first and crucial question in consid-
ering the convening role. To convene the parties for the first meeting
requires that the convening person, organization or governmental jurisdic-
tion be perceived as fair and credible—or possess sufficient sanctions over
the parties to make it virtually mandatory that they come to the table. There
are at least three types of convenors:
- a convenor with the required prestige or credibility
- a convenor with coercive power over the parties
- a convenor with considerable perceived influence or access to
resources desired by some or all of the parties.
EXAMPLES: Representatives of the first type are religious leaders and
elder statespersons (e.g., Pope John Paul in the Beagle Channel dispute and
former President Jimmy Carter in the 1989-90 Ethiopian-Eritrean talks). A
coercive convenor typically appears in international disputes where a third
nation believes it is in its best interest to bring disputing nations to the
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table (Touvaal and Zartman 1985). Carter's role as convenor of the Israel-
Egypt Camp David meetings is a good example of the third type, as is the
"mediation" of President Theodore Roosevelt in the 1906 Russia-Japan
conflict. The same is true of many of the good offices efforts of the secre-
tary general of the United Nations (Afghanistan, Iran-Iraq, and Cyprus
have been mentioned), as well as President Arias' role in convening the
five Central American states in the Contadora process. U.S. Secretary of
State Henry Kissinger's "shuttle diplomacy" between Egypt and Israel in
1974 is another much-publicized example of a powerful nation serving as
a convenor—although on this occasion the forum was a moving one,
embodied in a person, rather than a single place.
3. Emissaries and Brokers. When one or more of the parties wants to
explore negotiations but fears that direct contact will weaken its positions
or signal compromise, emissaries or brokers may initiate contact and con-
duct quiet or back channel negotiations about getting to the table. An his-
torical ally, a trading partner, a friendly academic or NGO—all are typical
occupants of this role.
EXAMPLES: Quiet Quakers, with no formal power and no diplomatic
portfolio, have brokered relationships and carried pre-table messages
between parties in a wide range of international and ethnic conflicts
(Yarrow 1978). An unusual broker's role was played by CBS anchor Walter
Cronkite in the activities leading to the Camp David talks between Israel
and Egypt in 1978. When Cronkite interviewed Egyptian President Anwar
Sadat on videotape in Cairo, Sadat made his now-famous "I will go to
Jerusalem" statement. Cronkite immediately flew to Israel to interview
Prime Minister Begin, who was prepared to respond to the electronic offer.
Sadat went to Israel, addressed the Knisset, and important pre-Camp David
relational groundwork was in place for President Carter.
4. Joint Problem-Solving Workshop. The joint problem- solving work-
shop may become a path to the negotiating table when the participants are
drawn from a specific conflict with some degree of ripeness. Such work-
shops—pioneered by John Burton in London in the 1960s and Herbert
Kelman in Cambridge and the Middle East in the 1970s, provide an ideal
"third focus" for the parties: analysis, in a non-negotiating, formally apo-
litical setting, of their dispute and the development of parameters and inno-
vative ideas for dealing with it. Alternately, the substantive focus may be
another subject of joint interest to the parties, so they may practice joint
analysis and problem-solving on an issue, with the expectation that the
experience may make a similar treatment of the actual issue possible. The
problem-solving workshop embodies most of the values for building the
forum presented in the next section. Keeping the parties focused on
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analysis rather than answers, and generating options rather than negotiat-
ing solutions, are the central dynamic of this process.
EXAMPLE: Such workshops have been conducted regarding Northern
Ireland, the Arab-Israeli conflict, Cyprus, Lebanon, and a variety of other
conflicts. Because of their confidential nature (and the cardinal rule that
facilitative third parties never publicly take credit), it is hard to prove
direct links between the workshops and subsequent negotiations. Parties
and observers do agree, however, that a series of Cyprus workshops in
1966 led directly to the talks between Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash and
Greek Cypriot president-to-be Clarides in 1968 (Mitchell 1981).
5. Joint Training. Bringing potential or actual disputants together for
training in analytical, negotiation, or other skills is another major potential
path to the negotiating table. Again the emphasis is on creating a situation
in which parties can interact in a non-bargaining, non-advesarial manner.
They are not brought together to negotiate or to solve a problem per se.
Nevertheless, such a setting can provide the opportunity for exploration of
the other party's interests, for building relationships, for sensing the param-
eters of an agenda, and for some negotiating about negotiating.
EXAMPLES: Roger Fisher and John Murray report their conduct of
joint training of management and union representatives of the aluminum
industry of Canada in 1983. Costly strikes in each of the two prior contract
periods prompted management to ask for help, and the Fisher/Murray
response was to convert the request for management consultation into the
provision of joint training in negotiation skills for management and the 15
labor organizations involved. The training provided the setting in which
informal non-committing exchanges could take place, and management
credits the Harvard team with creating the atmosphere in which a mutually
satisfactory contract was reached and another strike avoided. More recently,
the Harvard Negotiation Project has used this model in working with school
districts in Michigan and Ohio, resulting in negotiated resolution of diffi-
cult disputes.
While it is too early to measure its effectiveness in getting to the table,
the Hebrew University two-month Training Seminar in Pre-Negotiation for
Diplomats ("The Art and Science of Getting to the Table") is the first
attempt to apply this approach over an extended period of time (Rothman
1990). Fifteen diplomats posted in Israel took part in the training, whose
main aim was to develop in them critical thinking about conflict and its
resolution. The participants represented a dozen different countries and
reported great satisfaction with the experience. Whether there will be trans-
fer of the skills and the relationships awaits the entry of these diplomats
directly into the major conflicts of the region.
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6. Scholarly Conference. Bringing the conflict participants (or their
close academic allies) together can provide another setting in which the
possibilities of establishing direct negotiations can be addressed. The ritual
of formal academic presentations allows parties to effect a more objective
posture while presenting their cases, and often provides a vehicle to send
messages and float ideas to other parties. These ideas could not come in a
direct diplomatic or negotiating context for fear they would sound like
offers or demands which require a response.
EXAMPLES: The South Africa case offers many illustrations, all of
which provided protected environments in which scholars and activists
(many of them later involved in the post-February 2 negotiations shaping
the country's future) exchanged papers and built relationships. The
Williamsburg Conference of April 1988 brought major players in South
Africa together and produced a report in wide circulation in policy circles.
Former U.S. Senator Dick Clark's Southern Africa Policy Forum in
Bermuda in March 1989 offered a similar setting, with some participants
consenting to be on the island only when opposition parties were not. That
conference also produced a thoughtful document addressing many major
issues now on the table in ANC/government negotiations. A number of
scholar-activists from Israel and the West Bank attended the Conference on
Conflict Resolution in south Africa, Israel, and Northern Ireland sponsored
by the Friedrich Naumann Foundation and the Institute for a Democratic
Alternative in South Africa in September 1989 in Bonn. The scholarly
norms and climate of gatherings provides active combatants the space to
try different conceptualizations and behaviors regarding their conflict—
often the first step toward willingness to negotiate.
7. Ongoing Non-Official Mechanisms. Mechanisms built for ongoing
contact of scholars, diplomats, private citizens, and policy-makers across
the lines of a major conflict cleavage can provide the setting to negotiate
toward the table.
EXAMPLE: The Dartmouth Conference—now in its 22nd year of con-
tinuous U.S.-Soviet contact and beginning similar formats with China and
some Latin American countries—is the best illustration. It is not officially
sponsored by national governments, yet it has generated a number of ini-
tiatives which have found their way into official channels and is conducted
with the blessing of the foreign ministries.
8. Other Mechanisms. There are a number of other activities that can
help create the environment and build the tracks to the table for parties
who, for face-saving or other reasons, cannot meet directly about negotia-
tion. The varieties of "Track II" or non-official citizen diplomacy have
been growing rapidly. Peace walks, naturalist expeditions and other "field
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trips" have created among adversaries an atmosphere impossible to achieve
at the formal diplomatic table. U.S. and Soviet officials have been reported
to develop close personal and working relationships through such foxhole
experiences as mountaineering and gondola rides.
The object is always the same: find a setting in which disputing parties
can meet in a politically safe environment to explore ideas, build relation-
ships, learn the other parties' interests, and either directly or indirectly dis-
cuss the conditions under which they will be willing to come to the table.
Value Considerations: What Kind of Table?
Every human activity represents a choice among competing values, how-
ever implicit or unintended. Building a forum for negotiation of deep-
rooted political or constitutional conflicts is no exception. Not just any
table will do—not, for example, a table where the power relationships are
so asymmetric that the dominant group's reasons for being present are
stalling, public relations, and/or intelligence. Any third party committed to
helping get parties to the table in rancorous international or inter-identity
conflicts should be cognizant of the value choices implied, make them
explicit to all involved, and help the parties deal with them with clear pur-
pose and intentionality.
Values are conceptions of the desirable—and the undesirable. In well-
integrated cultures and social groupings, values are so well internalized
that most actors are not aware of them nor do they make conscious choices
about them. Conflict brings values to the surface, forcing consideration and
choice. Values beget (or at least justify) norms. How shall we make deci-
sions? What are the most important goals we should pursue? Is everyone
here to be treated as an equal participant? Every social interaction operates
based on norms or rules undergirded by values. Since the nature of the
forum and the interaction therein can be a dominant influence on the range
of outcomes possible and pursued, the mandate for explicitness is espe-
cially strong.
There are at least eight major value choices that are made—explicitly or
implicitly—in building a forum for negotiation and joint problem-solving.
For each, a mode is chosen, and it in turn contributes to the nature and
direction of the process:
1. Facilitative or Adjudicative? Is the aim of the forum to promote adju-
dication of the dispute by a legitimate authority, or to facilitate, joint solu-
tion by the parties? While the answer is obvious that facilitated joint
problem-solving is the goal, often parties (and sometimes third parties)
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come to the table with the goal of imposing a solution through superior
force or influence.
2. Cooperative or Adversarial? Litigation and formal diplomacy are
inherently adversarial. The parties are seen as opponents who must win or
at least get the best of the other party in a compromise. The negotiation
forum operates within a cooperative metaphor. Without the ability to estab-
lish this mode of operation, joint problem-solving (and thus, I would argue,
real resolution and long-term political stability) are impossible.
3. Private or Public? Peace conferences, many aspects of formal diplo-
macy, summit meetings, and similar vehicles for dealing with serious polit-
ical problems generally occur in public. While it is the public's business
that is being done, often serious negotiation only can take place in private,
away from the minute-by-minute scrutiny of the constituency or the con-
stant playing to the media and the court of public opinion. While timely
and appropriately concrete public reporting to constituents and other cru-
cial entities is important, the forum is conducted predominately in private.
A major reason for the success of Camp David in contrast to media-driven
summits is the 13-day isolation imposed by the convenor.
4. Formal or Informal? A key to successful negotiation is the ability of
parties to get beyond formal positions, absolutist historical arguments
(often clung to for face-saving reasons) and ritualized oppositional behav-
ior toward one another. A good negotiation setting should promote consid-
erable informal interactions, where common interests are discovered, trust
built, and a sense of the zone of agreement developed.
5. Problem Solving, Truth Telling or Fault Finding? The preferred value
here is, of course, the goal of problem- solving. Academic or research
forums rely on finding the right answer and presenting it in a timely and
generally highly elaborate form. Truth telling is not effective as a mode of
promoting negotiated resolution of conflict. Legal approaches are driven by
the finding of fault based on precedent. Fault finding is not appropriate as
the dynamic for negotiating resolution.
6. Analytical or Political? Negotiation of a resolution in a conflict
between nations or identity groups is ultimately a political act. But to
achieve such a resolution often requires a degree of analysis that is not
common in the heat of interaction in conflict. One of the most important
contributions that can be made by a properly-constructed forum is to keep
the emphasis sufficiently on analysis so the parties can develop a joint
understanding of the problem. Most negotiation sessions start with answers
instead of questions. "Position papers" are written and presented. Demands
(i.e., pre-chosen answers) are put on the table. The focus is on trading and
giving/taking. Ultimately that may happen in any negotiation, but the
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possibility of constructing joint solutions is greatly enhanced if analysis is
made a legitimate, early, and extensive activity.
7. Facilitated or Non-Facilitated? Can the parties manage their own
process? A good problem-solving process requires attention to site(s), fre-
quency of meetings, pacing, timing, plenary/caucus/task group mix, rela-
tion to outside constituencies, developing and adhering to ground rules, and
team discipline. The parties ultimately must chose whether any negotia-
tions should be conducted without a third party or with a coercive power
who thereby already has purchased a seat at the table.
8. Inventing or Deciding? To be effective, negotiations in complex con-
flicts must devote considerable energy to creating options that can unblock
impasses and move the process forward. Typical position-based negotiation
begins with demands and moves to trading, often overlooking a whole
range of creative options. The forum should promote periods when the par-
ties clearly understand they are not required to make a decision on what is
put on the table, but may be free to invent or generate new options.
Sometimes referred to as brainstorming or the nominal group technique,
inventing periods can promote creative interaction and provide innovative
plans for consideration (see Fisher and Ury 1981). An inventing interlude
can promote constructive deciding.
Summing Up: Building The Table
Getting to the table refers to the many process and substantive require-
ments that must be met if parties are to change the forum of their con-
flicting behavior from win/lose adversarial interaction to cooperative
problem-solving. Parties in deep-rooted, protracted conflicts are willing to
enter into negotiated problem-solving only if they perceive sufficient incen-
tives in turning from adversarial to cooperative methods. Such incentives
often are the result of the ongoing political interaction between the parties,
in which both come to see some form of negotiation or other joint pro-
cesses as more timely, less costly, or otherwise superior to war or other
forms of physical or economic coercion. Third-party intervenors have
available to them a wide range of approaches to induce parties to come to
the table when their ongoing interaction prevents or simply does not pro-
vide adequate incentives. These approaches are referred to in this analysis
as paths to the table, and they include, most prominently, one-on-one anal-
ysis, joint training, the use of emissaries or brokers, and track II interac-
tion. Negotiating about negotiating can be as complex as substantive
negotiations, with the attention necessarily directed to putting in place
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mutually acceptable auspices, location(s), procedures, time frame, level of
publicity, etc. If cooperative problem-solving is to take place, the table to
which the parties come must be undergirded by certain values: cooperation,
a problem-solving orientation, informality, analysis rather than politics, and
a willingness to invent options rather than be mired constantly in positional
bargaining.
Putting these elements and values in place by whatever path is only the
first step toward cooperative problem-solving. But no other steps are pos-
sible until the table is built.
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